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Foreword
Shelby D. Green
The American dream turned into a nightmare. Since early
in the last century, the goal of homeownership played a promi-
nent part in the American dream³one that the Federal Gov-
ernment encouraged through various policies and programs,
including subsidies, tax benefits, mortgage insurance, and the
creation of the secondary mortgage market. These programs
facilitated home ownership by, among other things, increasing
liquidity to loan originators. The rate of homeownership
climbed slowly, albeit steadily and safely. But then came the
subprime market. Homeownership leaped³but with dire con-
sequences. What drove this market was not the provision of
the stability and security of a home, but profits at the expense
of the dreamers. Loans with onerous terms were offered to the
most precarious and least sophisticated borrowers. The mil-
lions of defaults by these hapless borrowers roiled the mortgage
and financial markets. Scores of commercial banks that had
originated the improvident and poorly secured loans failed.
Venerable investment banks³such as Merrill Lynch, Lehman
Brothers, and Bear Stearns³that had invested heavily into
mortgage-backed securities collapsed. The packaging of mort-
gage-backed securities and derivatives by these investment
Associate Professor of Law and Director, LL.M. Program in Real Es-
tate Law, Pace University School of Law. J.D., Georgetown University Law
Center, B.S., Towson State College.
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banks, together with promises of high returns and guarantees,
was laudable, to be sure. But with the collapse, these issuers
defaulted on billions of dollars of promised investment re-
turns³and investors lost billions. Those we trusted, those
with expertise and insight³the economists, the regulators, and
the bankers³failed to see the signs of the impending disaster
and thus failed to divert us from this course. The role of hu-
man judgment waned as mathematical models designed to pre-
dict market outcomes seemed infallible. Few suspected that
the housing bubble would burst. Even as foreclosures accele-
rated and housing prices slipped, the regulators merely
shrugged. They did not see or feel the fateful vortex of ruin
swirling.
There are obvious parallels in history, situations where a
confluence of greed, excess, and misguided philosophy also
brought the nation to its knees. The Great Depression and the
savings and loan association debacle of the 1980s stand out. In
each of these prior instances, legislators and regulators were
each determined to put into place safeguards against a recur-
rence. Yet each time, after a period of relative stability, the
regulators relaxed their safeguards, believing that we could
once again trust in the integrity of market actors and the ra-
tionality of the market itself. The actors, for their part, seemed
to have all labored under a common myopia. They acted with-
out the prudence of knowing the underlying worth of their pur-
chases, without the constraints of traditional capital and risk
requirements, and without regard for market history.
The Symposium, Real Property, Mortgages, and the Econ-
omy: A Call for Ethics and Reforms, presented jointly by the
PACE LAW REVIEW and the Pace University School of Law,
L.L.M. Program in Real Estate Law on March 20, 2009, offered
a dialogue on the existing philosophies underlying the regula-
tion of the economy in general and the mortgage financing in-
dustry in particular, and discussed the need for a new ethic to
govern and motivate participants in the lending industry. We
considered ways that the economy might escape the ruthless
vortex that was created by hope, fear, and cupidity.
In this Symposium issue of PACE LAW REVIEW, the articles
set out to examine how we got to this point, yet again, and to
ponder how to set us on a safe course far away from another
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near ruin. My own article1 attempts to set the stage for the
other articles presented herein. It describes the frightening
magnitude of the crises³in the mortgage market, the courts,
and the financial markets³affecting our nation, as well as the
world, and it identifies the three ends that should be the focus
of our national response: preserving homeownership, protecting
the integrity of the markets, and avoiding the moral hazard.
The themes underlying these goals, now seemingly obvious to
many, yet elusive to most in the last few years, are taken up in
various ways by the other authors in this issue.
Professor Mark A. Edwards2 examines the history of bank-
ing in the United States and reveals how our regulatory
schemes³such as the tightening and loosening of constraints
on banks and other market participants³have almost mechan-
ically responded to the competing forces of ideology on the one
hand, and pragmatism on the other. The ideology of free mar-
kets had reigned until some crisis requiring pragmatic res-
ponses occurred. Understanding these historical patterns
should inform the development of a regulatory scheme that re-
flects a constant and consistent strategy that considers the im-
peratives and lessons of history.
Professor Vincent Di Lorenzo3 brings home these concerns
DQG H[SODLQV LQ UHDO WHUPV KRZ &RQJUHVV·V DLP WR FUHDWH D
more-or-less free market in mortgages by lifting regulatory
constraints on national banks and thrifts, and by moving to-
ZDUG RIIHULQJ RQO\ ´JXLGDQFHVµ GLG QRW IXOO\ FRQVLGHU WKH DYe-
nues for the self-interested and opportunistic conduct that such
a policy would create. Banks almost uniformly ignored the
guidances and made loans without consideration of a borrow-
HU·VDELOLW\WRUHSD\HPSOR\LQJDZKROHUDQJHRIH[RWLFDQGLn-
scrutable mortgage products. Not only did this hands-off regu-
latory model not work to improve homeownership, with the
millions of foreclosures and the ripple effects of this phenome-
non throughout the economy³including a drop in the gross

1. Shelby D. Green, Disquiet on the Home Front: Disturbing Crises in the
1DWLRQ·V0DUNHWVDQG,QVWLWXWLRQV, 30 PACE L. REV. 7 (2009).
2. Mark A. Edwards, Nationalization, De-Nationalization, Re-
Nationalization: Some Historical and Comparative Perspective, 30 PACE L.
REV. 124 (2009).
3. Vincent Di Lorenzo, Unsafe Loans in a Deregulated U.S. Mortgage
Market, 30 PACE L. REV. 154 (2009).

3

4

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:1

domestic product, consumer spending, and high unemploy-
ment³it created a net loss.
Navid Vazire4 continues with an analysis of the securitiza-
tion process, explaining how it provided liquidity which
enabled lenders to make loans to a greater number of people
and to people who otherwise would have been shut out of the
market. He also explains how the securitization process radi-
cally changed the incentives of lenders³from expecting returns
from safe investments over time, to expecting immediate gains
from up-front processing fees. As a consequence, lenders en-
gaged in practices that are now described as predatory. They
targeted the most vulnerable and precarious borrowers, who
already posed a risk of likely default, and this risk passed onto
investors in the securitization products.
Something other than sheer greed and short-sightedness
must account for the financial near-collapse. Professor Robin
Paul Malloy5 considers the extent to which there are systemic
flaws and fallacies in economic philosophy. He comments that
the UHOLDQFH XSRQ $GDP 6PLWK·V ´LQYLVLEOH KDQGµ SKLORVRSK\
has decidedly been shown as an incorrect decision. Such re-
liance must cease once one accepts the fact that markets are
not self-correcting. Indeed, if we move away from the concep-
WLRQ RI ´PDUNHWµ DV D GHVLUDEOH HQG LQ LWVHOI³the negative ef-
IHFWV IDOOLQJ RQ DOO WKRVH LQ WKH ZDNH RI DQRWKHU·V SXrsuit of
profit³toward something that enables the arrangement of ex-
change networks to achieve cost-effective goals and objectives,
then the need for regulation and oversight to confirm a mar-
NHW·V DELOLW\ WR HIIHFWXDWH WKHVH HQGV LV LPSHUDWLYH  -XGJPHQW
and accountability must be reintroduced into market transac-
tions.
Professor Prentiss Cox6 believes that the greatest regulato-
ry failure in this crisis was the shift in regulatory focus toward
the fiscal soundness of banking entities, and away from con-
sumer protection. In fact, federal regulatory agencies enacted
4. Navid Vazire, Smoke and Mirrors: Predatory Lending and the Sub-
prime Mortgage Loan Securitization Pyramid Scheme, 30 PACE L. REV. 41
(2009).
5. Robin Paul Malloy, Mortgage Market Reform and the Fallacy of Self-
Correcting Markets, 30 PACE L. REV. 79 (2009).
6. Prentiss Cox, The Importance of Deceptive Practice Enforcement in Fi-
nancial Institution Regulation, 30 PACE L. REV. 279 (2009).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/12

4

2009]

FOREWORD

5

regulations that preempted many effective state consumer pro-
tection laws. Consumer protection at the federal level should
include more than mere disclosure, but limits on lending prac-
tices should be prescribed and aggressive enforcement of con-
sumer protection laws must be undertaken. Allen H. Schein-
er,7 while recognizing the need for greater regulatory oversight,
believes that the best approach would be to develop uniform,
national standards, rather than to rely upon individual state
laws. He believes that state laws, while addressing predatory
lending³particularly those laws that have recently been
enacted³purport to impose liability upon assignees of mort-
gages, not because of any objective culpability, but solely as a
consequence of having purchased a loan. These laws are thus
based upon newly-crafted definitions of unfair trade practices,
and as such, risk market uncertainty and threaten to upset the
carefully crafted national policies, as reflected in recent
amendments to banking laws. Mr. Scheiner argues that a se-
curitized transaction is a national affair.
Banks and homeowners were not the only ones to be sent
reeling by the financial crisis. In fact, as Suzanne M. Garcia8
describes, reckless and improvident lending practices have
wreaked havoc in the title insurance industry as well, leading
to revenue shortages and reductions in staff. Not only do title
examinations now take longer to complete, but they have be-
come more complicated as many states have enacted procedur-
al requirements for making loans in the first place and for pur-
suing foreclosures. The failure to comply may mean that a loan
will be avoided or that title will fail, thus giving rise to claims
under the title policy. The specter of such claims is rather
large, particularly because an examination of the cold land
records cannot reveal the circumstances of a failure to comply
with borrower protection requirements. Marvin N. Bagwell9
describes how the whole process of securitization and the lack
of regulatory oversight provided an environment for more and
more schemes designed to fleece the next person down the line.
7. Allen H. Scheiner, State Subprime Lending Litigation and Federal
Preemption: Toward a National Standard, 30 PACE L. REV. 253 (2009).
8. Suzanne M. Garcia, A Glance at the Impact of the Subprime Mortgage
Crisis on the Title Insurance Industry, 30 PACE L. REV. 233 (2009).
9. Marvin N. Bagwell, &DQ·W /LYH :LWKRXW $LU 7LWOH ,QVXUDQFH DQG WKH
Bursting of the Real Estate Bubble, 30 PACE L. REV. 180 (2009).
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These circumstances enabled the denials or finger-pointing by
those who kept silent when they should have declared that the
WUDQVDFWLRQV´VWLQNWRKLJKKHDYHQµ
6R IDU WKH )HGHUDO *RYHUQPHQW·V UHVSRQVH WR WKLV JUDYH
crisis has been a massive infusion of capital³including loans to
ailing banks, purchases of bank stock, reduction of the Federal
5HVHUYH·V GLVFRXQW UDWH loan modification programs, and res-
cues of failing banks. These responses, though, seem to be ad
hoc, developed on the fly, as if responding to a sudden casual-
ty³an act of God. But who should pay for these efforts? How
should actors be put on notice of their liability for future disas-
ters? Professor Mehmet K. Konar-Steenberg10 identified paral-
lels to another national disaster that required massive and sus-
tained government involvement to remedy.
This earlier
response, CERCLA,11 involved a comprehensive scheme to hold
all potentially responsible parties liable for active conduct as
well as for the failure to address conduct that could produce
harm. In the current disaster, the range of potentially respon-
sible parties would quite fairly begin with the loan originators,
extend to credit ratings agencies, and also include investment
bankers. Professor Konar-Steenberg notes that this class
might be even broader.
The theme that seems to pervade the articles in this issue
of the PACE LAW REVIEW is the need to reign in the baser hu-
man instincts³those that manifest themselves in greed, undue
risk-taking, and folly³and to introduce higher norms of hones-
ty, prudence, and judgment. These themes will surely inform
legislators and regulators as they seek to adopt measures to
make the mortgage and financial worlds safe again.

10. Mehmet K. Konar-Steenberg, A Superfund Solution for an Economic
Love Canal, 30 PACE L. REV. 310 (2009).
11. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980, § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 1901 (2006).
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